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Soaring crime rates and law enforcement costs have produced widespread disillusionment and disenchantment with our criminal justice system. Even those who
operate its basic institutions, police officers, judges, and correctional officials, are
frequent critics of its performance, although they often differ about what is wrong.
The mood of the country with regard to crime and law enforcement "is one of
frustration and bewilderment."1 This discontent has resulted in the questioning of
our basic law enforcement institutions and our basic concepts of justice. While the
system as a whole has been subjected to critical re-examination, the evaluation of
performance has focused on the police. What we have been asking ourselves and
our public officials is, can we stem the rising tide of crime, and if so, what will it
cost? The attempt to obtain answers has raised additional questions. With regard to
the police, the three critical questions are: (i) what do the police produce, or should
they produce, and how can it be measured, (2) are the police producing at minimum
cost, and (3)how much police service do we want to buy?
As we shall demonstrate, the answers to these questions are a part of the overall
answer to the same set of questions posed for the criminal justice system as a whole.
A fundamental tenet of this paper is that the activities of the police cannot be
measured and evaluated without reference to the totality of criminal justice institutions and to the social environment in which these activities take place. This
paper discusses the conceptual and practical difficulties of defining and measuring
police output.
The first section sketches the overall problem of criminal justice resource allocation as it relates to the measurement of police output. We argue that police services
are not a final product, but rather an intermediate product in the overall production
of justice or law enforcement. The effectiveness of the police with regard to overall
law enforcement depends not only on their own operations but on the operations
of the courts, the prosecutor's office, the correctional system, and the other participants in law enforcement. We then introduce the concept of the social cost of
crime and demonstrate that the problem of defining justice can be circumvented*Director,
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for the purpose of determining the output of the criminal justice system-by
measuring the level of justice produced by reductions in this social cost. In addition,
if we posit that the social cost of crime increases with the number of offenses, then
we can justify using crime rates to measure the output of the criminal justice system.
Put in these terms, law enforcement is the product of the criminal justice system.
With this approach we can analyze the product concept and the determinants of
the optimum level of law enforcement.
The second section discusses a number of properties that various measures of
police output should satisfy. The properties are related to three basic functions for
which output measures are used: (i) program planning and evaluation, (2) evaluation of operating units, and (3) contracts for the sale of police services. The
emphasis, however, is on measurement for program planning and evaluation, and,
while measures are required for evaluating police performance at all levels from
the individual patrolman or his unit on up, primary emphasis will be given to
measuring total police services. Both cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are
discussed in some detail.
The third section surveys a number of approaches to the measurement of police
output. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are then discussed with
regard to the criteria set forth for output measures. Reference is made to a number
of basic papers on the measurement of police services. The final section addresses
the problem of the measurement of police output by examining the fundamental
ways in which police actions can affect the crime rate. If it can be established that
certain capabilities account for most of the police impact, then a measure of these
capabilities may be a good proxy for police output. A number of possible measures
are explored, and the additional empirical analysis required to validate these
measures is outlined.

ScARcrry AND JuscE
Justice, like the attainment of virtually all good things, requires the use of
scarce resources and therefore is in conflict with the other things that compete for
these limited resources? The operation of criminal justice institutions requires personnel, capital equipment, and land as do other productive activities; and the use
of these resources for the production of justice means foregoing the production of
other goods. Put in financial terms, these resources must be purchased; the amount
'In this paper the term justice is used to denote the output of the criminal justice system, whatever
that may be. This paper does not presume to deal with broader questions regarding the use of the
term justice. Rather than inquiring into the essence and nature of a just society, a question of infinite
difficulty, this paper will accept the scope for the activities of the criminal justice system as defined by
existing laws. Concededly, the existing set of laws define a certain aspect and concept of justice, which,
it might reasonably be contended, is deficient. However, this is not directly relevant to the main inquiry
of this paper. Subsequently, the output of the criminal justice system will be defined in terms of reducing
the social cost of crime.
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spent in the pursuit of justice can only be increased by spending less for something
else. To obtain increased spending for criminal justice, funds must be diverted from
other government programs or taxes must be raised, in which case private expenditure must be curtailed. Therefore, in considering the entire question of justice one
must constantly weigh whether the incremental gains to society are worth their
incremental costs. This leads to the realization that justice must be considered
like all other goods that compete for our limited resources; scarcity requires us
to strike compromises between the amounts of food, shelter, education, other goods
and services, and justice which we ideally might desire. Consequently, justice becomes a matter of degree rather than an absolute commodity.
For these reasons an operational system for criminal justice cannot be evaluated
in categorical terms of ethics or jurisprudence alone. To do so would eliminate
from consideration the constraints placed on society by the limits of technology and
resource availability and the fundamental choices which these limitations require.
This point of view does nbt necessarily conflict with that of jurisprudence or
ethics, but rather superimposes on them a framework for considering the choices
and tradeoffs inherent in a world of technical limitations and scarce resources.
A. Allocation of Resources Within the Justice Producing System
Resource allocation for criminal justice can be analyzed in terms of three separate but mutually interdependent decisions: (i) the decision regarding how much
of society's resources are to be devoted to the production of justice, that is, the total
budget to be allocated to the collectivity of institutions and agencies producing
justice, (2) the decision as to what portion of the total expenditure will go to each
of .these production units, and (3) the decisions within each production unit concerning the allocation of funds among specific production tasks.
The first decision involves contrasting the incremental increases in justice against
the incremental social costs of obtaining these increases. These social costs, measured
in dollars, represent foregone opportunities to produce other goods and services.
To arrive at the optimal expenditure on justice, the total spent should be increased
as long as each incremental increase in justice is valued more highly than the
incremental cost of obtaining it. The optimum is reached at the point at which
the value of the last increment just equals its cost and where the cost of further
increments exceeds their value. How much a community should spend on justice
depends on how justice is valued with respect to other goods and services, the cost
of justice relative to these goods and services, and the total wealth of the community. In general, the wealthier a community is, the more it will choose to spend
on every government program. However, scarcity of resources implies that no community is rich enough to push expenditure on all or even any one commodity to a
point where no one could benefit from the allocation of more resources to this
commodity.
The determination of the amount which should be spent for justice will depend
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to some degree on how the total expenditure is to be allocated among the various
production units and how it is to be allocated among various tasks within production
units. Very different effects on the overall production of justice will be produced
by a decision as to whether to dispense given funds to the correctional system
or to the courts or to the police. Similarly, the amount of justice that can be obtained
by any additional expenditure will depend on how these funds are used within the
agencies to which they are allocated. Suppose that resources were allocated to the
police and that they were earmarked for increasing the effectiveness of the police
in solving crimes. This increased capability might result in an increase in the
number of arrests which, in turn, would increase the number of cases which are
brought before the court. The overall effect on justice of increased police effectiveness will depend in part on the effectiveness of the courts and correctional institutions
as well. If as a result of delays in the court system it were impossible to prosecute
the additional persons arrested, then the effect might be negligible. Thus, the
contribution to justice by any one agency is critically dependent on the operation
of other agencies within the system.
The essential point is that the level of justice produced-however justice may be
defined-results from the collective action of those agencies and individuals who
participate in the criminal justice system, and it is in this sense and for this reason
that the criminal justice agencies must be considered as a system. This should not
be construed to suggest that the agencies are organized to operate in a systematic
and integrated way or that they perceive a need to pursue common objectives. In
practice, quite the contrary appears to be true. To quote the Task Force on Law
Enforcement of the Violence Commission, "Each participant sees the commission
of crime, and the procedures of justice, from a different perspective. His daily
experience and his set of values as to what effectiveness requires and what fairness
requires are, therefore, likely to be different. As a result, the mission and priorities of
a system of criminal justice will, in all likelihood, be defined differently by a policeman, a trial judge, a prosecutor, a defense attorney, a correctional administrator,
an appellate tribunal, a slum dweller, and a resident of the suburbs. '' 3 The police
are part of this system, and the effect of their operation on the overall provision of justice depends not only on their own actions but on the manner in which
the rest of the system is operated.
The police are essentially in the position of a firm that produces an intermediate
product that will be used as an input to the production of a final product called
justice. That is, they produce services that are not desired as such, but only
because they contribute to a final objective or output. For example, individuals do
not derive utility directly from the existence of crime-related police activities; rather,
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they demand these services as a part of the total activity of crime control. In the
absence of crime, most of us would happily dispense with these police functions.
Looking at the police in this way gives us an insight into the problems of
measuring police output. First, economic theory tells us that the value of an intermediate product must be measured in terms of its contribution to the final product.
Ideally we would like to measure the contribution of police activity in terms of its
contribution to justice. For example, in considering an increase in police patrols,
we would like to be able to measure its impact on justice. This, however, requires
a measure of justice which again confronts us with the problem of defining justice.
The difficulty is that individuals with different backgrounds and philosophical positions will subscribe to different objectives and concepts of justice, and no one
definition will command universal acceptance.
B. The Social Cost of Crime
The way economists have circumvented this definitional dilemma is to take our
system of laws as given and to posit that the commission of crime involves the
imposition of a cost on society.4 Furthermore, it is assumed that the social cost of
crime is an increasing function of the number of offenses. This cost can be measured
in monetary units and represents the amount that society would be willing to pay
to eliminate crime. One conceptual experiment that could be performed to evaluate
the social costs of crime would be to confront each individual with the possibility
of trading income for reduced crime. The cost of a given number of offenses to an
individual would be computed on the basis of the maximum amount that he would
be willing to pay to reduce offenses from that level to zero. The social cost of
crime would then be computed as the sum of these individual costs. This particular
procedure will be explored in some detail when we discuss benefit-cost analysis
with regard to police activity.
There are several advantages to this approach. First, it is completely general
in that we can abstract the specific effects of crime that result in social costs which
will be highly individual and non-uniform in nature. Thus, the framework is
sufficiently broad to cover differeit concepts of justice and different definitions of
crime. For example, crimes involving the mutual consent of those directly affected
as well as crimes where there is a victim can be considered to result in social costs.
The second advantage is that the output of the criminal justice system can be
defined in terms of the reduction in the cost of crime, and, thus, the ambiguity inherent in comparing the reduction of different types of crimes can be eliminated.
i. Inherent Costs

While the, output of the criminal justice system is the reduction of crime as
measured by social cost, this does not imply that the optimum policy is to produce
'Different individuals, in general, will evaluate the cost of different crimes differently. For some
individuals certain crimes may have a negative cost or represent a net gain.
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the maximum output, that is, to reduce crime to the lowest feasible level. Rather,
we must consider the costs of the criminal justice system and weigh these against
the benefits of reducing the social cost of crime. The costs of the criminal justice
system include not only the direct resource costs of operating our criminal justice
agencies-salaries for agency personnel and the cost of equipment-but also resource
costs borne by private individuals. For example, the individual who is brought to
trial must bear the cost of his defense, witnesses and juries contribute their time,
and there are large private expenditures on crime protection. There are additional
costs which are inherent in any system of law enforcement. Activities of law enforcement inevitably require some restriction of freedom, such as the imposition of
occasional curfews or the closing of areas to allow police to operate more effectively.
These restrictions generate costs. In addition, because of imperfect information,
law enforcement agencies make mistakes, and these mistakes create costs for individual citizens. The police at times arrest innocent persons and the acts of proper
investigation and interrogation may impose substantial costs on those who are involved. Similarly, courts sometimes convict and sentence innocent people. There
is no way to completely eliminate this problem in a world of uncertainty. In
statistical terms, the problem is one of a trade-off between two types of errors, errors
occurring when the guilty are not convicted and errors occurring when the innocent
are convicted. Under conditions of uncertainty, an increase in the probability of
apprehending and convicting the guilty generally results in a simultaneous increase in
the probability of apprehending and convicting the innocentY Finally, there are

costs that arise when the authority vested in these agencies is abused. The existence
of strong police powers which can be used to reduce crime opens the possibility of
increased social cost from their abuse. Therefore, in computing the social costs of
operating the criminal justice system, one must take into account not only the
resource costs of these criminal justice agencies, but the resource costs that are incurred by private individuals and the implicit costs imposed by the operation of the

system itself.
The objective of society in operating the criminal justice system should then be

to minimize the combined social cost of crime and the social cost of the criminal
justice system. This is the approach that has been adopted by economists who have
recently addressed the question of resource allocation and law enforcement. 6
'This point is explored in Harris, On the Economics of Law and Order, 78 J. POL. EcoN. 165 (,970).
The view that the criminal justice system is in some sense attempting to optimally trade off between the
simultaneous minimization of the two types of errors corresponds to the dichotomous models of the
system as presented in H. PAC.ER, Tim LmeTs Or T-s CRIMINAL SANCTION (1969). Packer constructs
a Criminal Control Model which is concerned with convicting as many guilty parties as possible even
at the expense of convicting innocent ones, and a Due Process Model which seeks to defend the rights
of the defendant even at the expense of acquitting guilty parties.
' The basic work in a modem welfare economics analysis of crime is that of Gary Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. Ecom 169 (1968). Becker seeks to elaborate a
social loss function, which defines the social cost of crimes. This function has four arguments, namely
L = L(DCbfO)
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2.

Use of Statistics: The Crime Rate

From a practical point of view, the critical problems inherent in analyzing the
criminal justice system involve specifying the cost of crime and identifying and
measuring the implicit or intangible costs that are associated with law enforcement
itself. There is no generally accepted procedure for computing the social cost of
crime and as a result the search for a measure of the system's output has focused
on the use of the crime rate. By positing that the social cost of crime is an increasing
function of the number of offenses and that the output of the criminal justice
system is measured by the reduction in this cost, one can justify the statement that
law enforcement is the output of the criminal justice system. Similarly, by comparing the costs of enforcement with the reduction in the cost of crime from improved enforcement, one can define the optimum level of enforcement.
The successful use of crime statistics to represent the social cost of crime in lieu
of any satisfactory method for actually ascertaining these costs will depend in part
upon our ability to weight crime data according to the seriousness of each crime.
With such weighting, the data can be incorporated into a single index; without it
the allocation of police resources would be distorted because an unweighted statistical
measure would indicate that the deterrence of a relatively minor crime such as a
$50 larceny is equivalent to the deterrence of an armed robbery. To date, little
effort has been made to systematically determine society's ranking of the seriousness
of specific crimes 7 One must also keep in mind that crime rates are conditioned by
both the existing laws and the population to which these laws apply. If either the
laws or the population are varied, a change in the crime rate will result. In order
to use crime statistics to evaluate the system's performance, a corrective factor must
be included for differences in the basic population and the basic operative laws.
The relevant statistics for the purpose of evaluating crime rates are not the number of crimes reported to the police but are, instead, the actual number of crimes
which occur. As has been well documented in the literature, the relationship beD =the net "damage" stemming directly from criminal events, is an increasing function
of the level of criminal activity.
C = the net cost function stemming from the cost of apprehension and conviction of criminals, also an increasing function of the level of criminal activity and of the probability,
p, that any given criminal event will result in an arrest and conviction.
bf-the social cost of punishment, which is a function of the nature of punishment, f,
proscribed for each offense.
0 = the supply of criminal events, a function of p and f as well as of other considerations.
The policy variables accessible to the criminal justice system are p, the probability of arrest and conviction,
and f, the punishment. The goal is to vary p and f so as to minimize IL the social cost (loss) from
criminal events. An article by George Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. Ecou.
526 (1970) builds on Becker's analysis and concludes that "the goal of enforcement . . . is to
achieve that degree of compliance with the rules of prescribed (or proscribed) behavior that the society
believes it can afford" which implies that the marginal social return on enforcement be set equal to the
marginal social cost.
'For examples of some attempts to derive a weighting system for crime statistics, see T. SELN &
where:
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tween actual occurrences and reported occurrences may vary depending on a
number of factors, such as the characteristics of the population base, police reporting
practices, and so on. Thus, under carefully specified conditions, the performance of
the police may be measured using indices based on crime rates; when so controlled,
this measure satisfactorily reflects the contribution of the police to the output of
criminal justice in the sense that a decrease in such a crime index will correspond to
a decrease in the social cost of crime.
Even assuming that accurate statistics on the occurrence of criminal events
were obtainable, significant difficulties in measuring police performance would
remain due to the variations in the underlying characteristics of the population and
the differential effects resulting from the activities of the rest of the criminal justice
system. What is needed is a measure of police performance that relates to crime
rates but which is independent of factors that the police cannot affect. This type of
gauge would be useful not only in examining the impact of a change in police activity
on crime, but would also help us to evaluate the level of effectiveness which is independently achieved by the police.
II
POLICE OUTPUT MEASURES

A. Uses and Characteristics of Measures
The major uses of police output measures are: (I) in management evaluation
of operating units, (2) in contracts for police services, and (3) in program planning
and evaluation. The required properties of a useful police output measure differ
depending on the use for which the measure is needed. The social cost of crime
and the number of crimes committed are not suited to serve as measures for all
purposes.
Assessing Operating Units
The first use involves measuring the performance of operating units in order
to evaluate whether they maintain acceptable performance standards. Most attempts
by police departments to develop output measures have been for this purpose. For
example, the number of arrests made by a traffic officer may be used to rate his
productivity. The basic difference between the evaluation of operating units and
the evaluation of programs to which these units contribute is that in the former
the primary interest is in assessing how well a specific task is being performed
while in the latter it is in judging the extent to which the performance of this
task contributes to the production of justice.
Although the emphasis of this paper is not on the evaluation of individual
I.

I See Wheeler, Criminal Statistics: A Reformulation of the Problem, 58 J. CiuM. L.C.&P.S. 317
(1967); PRESIDENT'S CONMSSION ON LAW ENrORcEMENT AND TIE AIDmNSTEATION OF JUSTICE, (us M
AND ITs ImPAcr-AN ASSEmENT Ch. 2 (1967).
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functional units within the police, it is instructive to consider several properties that
an output measure must have to serve this purpose. There must be an accepted rule
for computing output, and the data necessary for this computation must be available.
These two attributes are prerequisites if a measure is to be of practical use. Note
that neither the social cost of crime nor a weighted crime index satisfy these conditions unless an accepted procedure for estimating the cost of crime or for weighting
different crimes can be specified. These tasks are closely related since ideally crimes
should be weighted in proportion to their social cost.
The third requirement for evaluating operating performance is that the effect
on the measure of output of an operating unit can be isolated from the effects of
other factors. As will become apparent, this condition is essential for contracting
as well as for planning and evaluation. This problem, however, is most acute in
evaluating small operating units within the police. As previously mentioned, one
of the difficulties with using changes in crime rates to measure changes in police
performance is that one may not be able to separate changes caused by the police
from changes caused by other factors. This difficulty would be of absurd proportions
if, for example, an attempt were made to measure the output of a single patrolman
in terms of the crime rate. This example of the individual patrolman illustrates a
fourth requirement. The output measure selected must be sufficiently sensitive to
register the effect of the activity being considered. The problem of sensitivity is
related to the problem of segregating the effects, or output, of a given activity from
other factors, but it is primarily a question of isolating the effects of the activity
from random fluctuations in the measure of output. This requires that the effect
of the activity in question be large relative to such random variations.
It is thus posited that to be of practical use for evaluating operating performance,
an output measure must have the four properties identified above. These attributes
are also essential to contracting and to program planning and evaluation. There are
many functional units within the police for which various output measures have
been proposed. However, a complete discussion of these lies beyond the scope of
this paper. The foregoing discussion has been included for completeness and because many of the measures that one encounters when dealing with the police are
for evaluating internal performance. It is important that one consider these measures
in terms of the function they serve.
2. Contracting for Police Service
The second use of output measures which we shall examine is in contracting for
police service. In Los Angeles County, for example, communities within the County
contract with the County for the provision of police services. Through area-wide
consolidation of such activities as police training, laboratories, and record keeping,
local communities are contracting for these inputs to the production of police services. While contracting for police services is not widespread at present, there is
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evidence that as communities seek new ways to obtain the cost savings and improved services associated with scale economies in production and at the same time
retain control over the level and type of service they receive, contracting arrangements will increase. Contracting offers many of the advantages of consolidation
without the loss of local control.
Clearly, to be used as a basis for contracting, a measure of what is to be provided must be defined by an unambiguous rule for computing what in fact is
provided and the requisite data must be available for making such computations.
In addition, the measure must be independent of other factors which may be beyond the control of either party to the contract. For example, if the County of Los
Angeles were to contract with a local community for police services and payment
were based on the rate of reported crime, then an increase in reporting or an
increase in crime resulting from a change in the composition of the communityalthough totally unrelated to police activity-could lead to a decrease in measured
police services and therefore a smaller payment. If, in fact, we could correct for all
other factors, police service might be contracted on the basis of such a performance
measure. Because other factors cannot be fully accounted for, in practice contracting
has been based on the quantity of inputs such as the number of man-hours or
vehicle-hours, and so on. Consequently, such contracts have more closely resembled
employment contracts than sales contracts?
The basic problem in this situation is that the supplier wants to relate the
measured product to the cost of producing it. However, if uncertainty regarding
the relationship between the cost of production and the value of what is produced
is too great, he may agree only to supply certain inputs for a given price; such an
arrangement is essentially an employment contract. On the other hand, the buyer
would prefer to relate what he pays to what he is getting in terms of his basic
goals, that is-in the jargon of utility theory-in terms of the arguments in his
utility function. Thus, a buyer of police services would like to have a contract
written in terms of the crime rate; this would be like a sales contract where
payment is based on the delivery of a desired product meeting given specifications.
He may, however, accept the uncertain output associated with merely buying inputs
to the final product if the reduction in the cost of obtaining a given, expected output is sufficiently great. An employment contract shifts uncertainty regarding the
final output from the seller to the buyer. In theory one could eliminate this uncertainty by writing a contract specifying all possible contingencies; however, in
practice, including these specifications may be impossible or simply too costly to
make this a feasible alternative.'0
3. ProgramPlanning and Evaluation
Consider now the use of output measures in program planning and evaluation
'See Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship, 19 ECONOMETRICA 293 (1951).
10 Id.
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aimed at obtaining optimal resource allocation. Planning is the activity of identifying and relating alternative means to desired ends, and evaluation is the activity
of determining which of the alternatives best achieves these ends. Therefore, it is
basic to planning and evaluation than an objective exist. For this objective to be an
operational one, it must be stated with sufficient precision to permit a determination
of whether or not a specific program will contribute to the achievement of the
objective. Unless goals can be stated in operational terms, it is not possible to relate
means to ends with any confidence. For example, suppose that a stated objective of
the police were to produce a secure community. Because there could be many
possible interpretations of the meaning of "secure community," each having different
implications for police operations, this statement does not meet the requirements of
planning. If, however, we were to interpret the level of security to be the per
capita incidence of crime, then the planner could develop programs directed to
reducing crime.
The same problem arises in evaluation. Suppose that a planner is considering a
new police program for increasing community security and that if this program
is not adopted, the existing program will remain in effect. Our initial position is
therefore the existing level and type of police activity which have produced the
existing level of security. Evaluation requires that we determine whether by adopting
the new program the level of security will increase, decrease, or remain the same.
To accomplish this we must define security in such a way that given any two
situations, we can unequivocally determine whether the level of security in the
first is greater than, equal to, or less than the amount of security in the second.
Thus, we need an operational decision rule, specified in advance, for determining
what to observe and how to rank any two situations on the basis of what is
observed. In technical terms, we must be able to define an ordinal ranking of all
possible situations with regard to community security. This, in itself, is a first step
toward quantification, because if we can establish a rule for deciding between the
level of objective achievement in any two situations, then one can assign numbers
to various levels of achievement, with higher numbers being assigned to higher levels
of achievement. By so doing one quantifies objective achievement on a scale where
only the ordinal properties of the scale are significant, that is, the only important
property is whether one number is greater than another. How much greater or
how many times as great is of no significance on such a scale. If a program
produces an increase in the achievement of the objective, then the output of the
program is this increase and can be measured in the same terms as the objective.
Note that if we define security in terms of the per capita incidence of crime, this
provides the desired ordinal ranking of all possible situations.
At this point a word of caution is in order. While it is true that planning and
evaluation require that the objective be stated so that given two situations it can
be determined whether one is better than another with respect to the achievement of
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that objective, this is not the only condition that a statement of purpose must meet.
To be of practical use it must command widespread acceptance. We might redefine
the objective of community security in terms of per capita incidence of crime
only to find that a decrease in the incidence of crime was accompanied by a general
feeling that the community was less secure. In this case, while the objective of
security was stated in operational terms, the operational statement would not
accurately reflect social judgement.
B. The Cost of Producing Justice
While it is important to be able to rank alternative situations with regard to
an objective, in many cases we wish to compare levels of achievement or output
with the costs of obtaining them. This is necessary in cost-benefit analysis, costeffectiveness analysis, and the evaluation of scale economies for determining the
scale of production that minimizes unit costs. In some of these cases additional
requirements must be imposed on the measure of police output.
i. Cost-Benefit Analysis

In cost-benefit analysis, the level of objective achievement is converted to a dollar
value by estimating the values that would be obtained if one carried out the
previously described procedure of allowing individuals to trade increments of achieve-

ment for income. The benefits to any single individual would be measured by his
maximum willingness to pay for a reduction in crime, and total social benefits would

be the sum of individual benefits. Stated in monetary units, benefits could then
be compared with costs. The cost-benefit criterion directs that if the benefits of a
program exceed its costs, the program should be undertaken. If there are two
mutually exclusive alternatives, both of whose benefits exceed their costs, then the
program which maximizes net benefit should be chosen. 1
Returning to the example of measuring community security in terms of the
per capita incidence of crime, the measurement of benefits would require a procedure
for computing the total amount that individuals in the community would willingly
pay for each reduction in the incidence of crime. Because police services or security
are not generally marketed, there is no evidence from direct transactions on which

to base an estimate of benefits. As in the case of most publicly produced goods, one
can only infer from other types of evidence the value that people attach to reducing
the incidence of crime.
Measuring the benefits from a reduction in crime is essentially equivalent to
measuring the social cost of crime. It is an area of investigation that has recently attracted the attention of economists. At present, this type of analysis contains a number
of unresolved methodological issues as well as data problems. Among the most
important of these decisions regarding methodology is whether one should include
"For an explanation of the issues involved in benefit-cost analysis, see LND, Benefit-Cost Analysis:
A Crltetion for Social Investment, in WATER REsouRcEs MANAGEMENT AND PUB. PoLICY (1968).
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benefits and costs to all individuals or whether benefits and costs to individuals
committing illegal acts should be excluded 1 2 For example, should the exchange
of goods that takes place through theft be considered a cost of crime or a transfer
of goods with an offsetting benefit to the criminal who obtains the stolen goods?
Most economists would agree that there is some loss from theft because stolen goods

are worth less simply as a result of being "hoe' items which cannot be distributed
through legal channels. However, whether the total value of goods stolen should be
counted as a social cost is an issue which has not been resolved. The answer makes
a significant difference in evaluating certain crime control programs.
In general, the threat of crime imposes on an individual a random variable representing possible losses just as does the threat of an earthquake, typhoon, disease, or
any other phenomenon that may harm that individual. To the extent that the
individual can and does fully insure against such occurrences, the maximum premium
he pays reflects the costs from the threat of crime. Yet, one cannot fully insure
against many crimes either because the necessary insurance is not available or because
one cannot restore life or health impaired by crime. Therefore, many of the costs
of the threat of crime remain uninsured. As a result, individuals may change their
patterns of life and invest in private means of protection against crime. They may
change residences, stay home at night, and invest in locks and other security measures
to reduce the risk of being a victim. All of these represent costs that the individual
incurs. Many of these costs can be observed and used in constructing a lower bound
on the total social cost of crime.
A conceptual problem exists for so-called "crimes without victims" in which
the only people directly affected by the criminal act have freely consented to it.
Individuals not directly affected by such crimes feel they have a stake in such
behavior or laws against the acts would not exist. However, it is not clear how one
would assess the price individuals in society would be willing to pay to reduce, let
us say, the level of marijuana use or homosexual encounter.
If, in fact, we could get reasonably accurate measures of the social cost of crime,
it would be an important step toward evaluating the optimal level of law enforcement. It would allow us to compare the marginal costs and benefits of programs
of law enforcement and would pave the way to answering both the questions of
whether the police are producing at minimum cost and how much and what kinds of
police services are desired. For this reason, further analysis of social cost is important. Nevertheless, this approach to the measurement of police output does not
provide a short-run solution to the need for measuring police output.
2.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

The concept of cost-effectiveness is closely related to benefit-cost analysis; how2
" For example, Becker, in Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, supra note

6, indicates

that the "social value of the gain to offenders" from committing a crime should be included in any
calculation of benefits, while Stigler, in The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, supra note 6, argues against
its inclusion.
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ever, output is not measured in dollars. It is equally useful in answering the question
of whether a given level of output is being produced at minimum cost, but it is less
useful in determining the optimal level of production. The great advantage of this
technique is that it can be used with respect to most measures of'output.
Suppose that we were considering a program to increase the effectiveness of
the police response by making it faster. Our objective is to reduce crime by interrupting a larger number of crimes in progress. We might choose to measure
the effectiveness of the program in terms of its effects on the incidence of crime
as before. However, there are two problems with this approach: depending on
the size of the program, this measure may or may not be sensitive to changes in
response time, and it may be difficult to isolate the effects of a decrease in response
time from other factors. Obviously, the faster the police arrive, the greater the
probability of interrupting a crime in progress. This, in turn, can be assumed to
reduce crime rates both because of the deterrent effect of increasing the probability of arrest and because by catching and incarcerating more criminals there will
be fewer at large.
Using the cost-effectiveness approach, one would determine alternative ways of
producing each level of effectiveness and the cost of each alternative. Proceeding
in this way one would ascertain the minimum-cost alternative for each level of
effectiveness. This is equivalent to determining the most efficient way of producing
each fixed level of output. In order to decide the optimum level of output, however,
the decision-maker must trade off increments in cost against measured increments
in production. In this case, the decision-maker would also have to be able to relate
increases in measured performance with changes in the ultimate objective. For
example, in the case of police response time and its relation to the likelihood of interrupting a crime in progress, he should know that unless the response time is less
than fifteen minutes, there is a low likelihood of interrupting a reported crime in
progress. Suppose, for the purpose of discussion, that if the response time were ten
minutes there would be a one-in-ten chance of interrupting a reported crime in
progress, whereas there would be a nine-in-ten chance if the response time were
two minutes. In this case the critical range would be between ten minutes and two
minutes. As long as this is known and accounted for in the analysis, it presents no
special difficulties. The decision-maker would take into account that changes in
measured performance are to be weighted differently at different points in the scale.
Significant problems arise when the cost-effectiveness framework is used to
evaluate alternative programs to improve police response in different communities.
Assume that you were given the responsibility of allocating a fixed budget to
police departments for programs to improve their response capability and that your
job was to allocate these funds so as to maximize the increase in police response
capability. Suppose that you had before you two proposals from two police departments in cities of identical size, each of which would exhaust your entire budget.
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The proposal from city A would result in a decrease in response time from one
hour to thirty minutes, whereas the proposal from city B would reduce response
;time from ten minutes to seven minutes. Using the response time alone as a
measure of effectiveness, the increase in the level of effectiveness of city A is ten
times as great as that for city B. Since the costs are the same in both, the costeffectiveness of city A's program would be ten times as great as the cost-effectiveness
of city B's program. However, a reduction in response time from one hour to onehalf hour will have virtually no effect on the number of crimes interrupted, whereas
a reduction from ten minutes to seven minutes will have a very significant effect.
Therefore, if one were to choose response time as a measure of effectiveness and to
allocate money to programs on the basis of this measure, the result would be a gross
misallocation of resources. While a complete discussion of the mathematical properties of output measures is beyond the scope of this paper, the message is clear.
Care must be taken in selecting the quantitative measures for given objectives in
order to insure that these measures have the properties necessitated by the purposes for
which the measure is to be used. In this case, differences at various levels of output at
different locations must not be valued equally. Exactly the same point applies to
finding the level of output at which per unit costs are minimized. Depending on
the scale of measurement, the minimization of per unit cost will require totally
different production decisions.
III
BASIC APPROACHES TO MEASUING POLICE OUTPUT

There have been several attempts to define a procedure for measuring police output. A number of the more important of these are reviewed and analyzed in this
section of the paper. Approaches to the measurement of police output fall into four
general categories. One approach has been to measure the output of the police in
terms of the cost of inputs, or the per capita expenditures on the police. A second
approach has been to measure the output of the police in terms of the relationship of
intermediate products-arrest rates, response times, and so forth-to overall law
enforcement. A third approach has been to choose a measure of final output, such
as the crime rate or the probability of an individual's becoming a victim of a crime,
to evaluate the effectiveness of the police. Finally, some effort has been made to
measure the output of the police in terms of the dollar value of benefits. These four
approaches do not as yet provide a completely satisfactory basis for any of the uses
of police output measures discussed in the previous section.
A. Cost of Inputs
In using -the dollar value of inputs as a measure of police outputs, there is an
implicit assumption that increased spending for police services will produce more of
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what is desired from that service. A further implicit assumption is that the additional
funds will be used efficiently. A problem with the latter assumption is that the
efficient use of funds cannot be determined independently from a measure of output. For purposes of social accounting, the outputs of public services have traditionally been valued as equal to the direct cost of providing them. By definition, an
additional dollar input will produce an additional dollar of output; and if one spends
more, one will get more. However, to measure output by automatically equating it
with input is of little use if one wishes to use the output figure for the purpose of
evaluating the allocation by the police of these resource inputs. Nor does output
measured in terms of input provide a basis for comparing one police program to
another, either in terms of their absolute level of effectiveness or in terms of their
cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, expenditure data cannot by itself be used to estimate
whether there are increasing returns to scale in the provision of police services.
By definition, there are constant returns to scale when police output is measured
in terms of dollar inputs. While input cost data is important in determining the
appropriate level of expenditure on police services, it cannot simultaneously be used
as an output measure against which to compare these costs. Therefore, aside from
social accounts, the primary use of measuring outputs by inputs is contracting for
police services.
One interesting study designed to assess whether there are economies of scale
in the provision of police services was performed by Werner Hirsch as part of an
attempt to determine the expenditure implications of metropolitan growth and
consolidation. 3 As is suggested in the foregoing comments, he could not use
police expenditures alone as a measure of output in such a study. To get around
this problem, he uses an index of the scope and quality of police services based on
the independent ratings of five police experts."4 The index incorporates their judgement, as police experts, on the total strength and capability of the police force and
the basic conditions bearing on the policing problem. Hirsch then uses multiple
regression techniques to estimate per capita expenditure as a function of not only
this index of quality but also of other variables such as population, miles of streets,
and population density.
Hirsch concludes from his data that for the police and for all but a small group
of municipal services no significant economies of scale exist. On this basis he dismisses arguments for metropolitan governmental consolidation which are based
on alleged per capita cost savings. However, Hirsch's model involves methodological difficulties which, in fact, make it impossible to draw any conclusions
regarding the existence or non-existence of scale economies from his results. The
model, as specified, is not such that one can conclude that there are no economies
"'Hirsch, Expenditure Implications of Metropolitan Growth and Consolidation, 41 REV. Ecob. &
STATISTICS 232 (1959).

" Id.

at 237.
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of scale from the fact that per capita expenditures do not increase with increases
in the number of people served or with increases in the area served.'
B. Intermediate Products
The second approach to measuring police output is to use some measure of the
intermediate products of the police as an indicator by proxy of the final output.
A minimum requirement for such a proxy is that there exist reasons for believing
that variations in this proxy will show a high correlation with changes caused in the
final output. For example, if there were evidence that the arrest rates were negatively
correlated with crime rates, then this might provide a good proxy for police performance. In addition, the proxy should not be such that it can be varied by discretionary action of the police without any corresponding change in the final
output. For example, arrest rates might be altered strictly by a police decision to
reduce the evidence required for arrest while the number of crimes committed and
the number of persons convicted might change little, if at all.
Another problem encountered is that the police do not produce a single product
but instead, several products, some of which are not related to law enforcement.
In fact, in terms of the time expended by police personnel a relatively small amount
is directly related to crime control as compared with general social service functions.' 6 Even in the case of crime-related activity, there are a number of functions
that are performed and each has a particular effect with respect to the reduction of
different crimes. This creates two serious practical problems for the measurement of
police output. First, different measures of intermediate products or functions may
be proxies for different outputs which must be assigned weights before they can
be compared. Second, if one is trying to measure the cost-effectiveness of lawenforcement programs, one must subtract police expenditures for social service
functions in order to arrive at a figure reflecting the net cost with respect to crime.
Unfortunately, there are virtually no data on police costs that are delineated as to
program. This makes the task exceptionally difficult.
One attempt to measure police output in terms of the intermediate services
performed was carried out by Schmandt and Stephens. 17 They divide police services
into sixty-five categories, each representing specific activities of the police. Examples
of categories are motorcycle and foot patrol, criminal investigation, radio communication, and radar speed units. A service index for a police force is then
derived by adding the number of functions performed. The weakness of such an
index is apparent. It does not account for either the quantity or quality of each subfunction. Furthermore, since there is no weighting system, all subfunctions are
5

" See Tiebout, Economies of Scale and Metropolitan Governments, 42 REv. EcoN. & STAr-srcs 442
(196o).
6

" See Misner, The Urban Police Mission, 3 Isstrs IN CRImINOLOGY 38 (Summer, 1967) or Chicago

Police Department Operations Research Task Force, Allocation of Resources in the Chicago Police Department, 1969 (Chicago) (Mimeographed).
"' Schmandt & Stephens, Measuring Municipal Output, 13 NAT'i TAx J. 369 (196o).
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regarded as of equal importance to the police mission. Schmandt and Stephens
were aware of these weaknesses, but they believed the index to be still useful. Yet,
such a functional index would be of limited value for the three central uses of
output measures: evaluating operating units, program planning, and the contract
pricing of police services. For example, Schmandt and Stephens conclude that their
index indicates that police forces serving larger populations provide more services,
and thus are better forces. Alternatively, this index may only indicate that larger
police forces have more specialized units within their organization, not that they
provide more services per capita than a smaller force.
C. Statistical Representatives for Final Output
Alternative proxies for the crime-related output of the police are number of
arrests,"8 the clearance rate,' 9 and police response time.2° Arrest rates and clearance
rates suffer from the defect that they are subject to discretionary change by the
police without yielding corresponding changes in the final output and that changes
in these rates may occur as a result of changes in factors totally unrelated to police
performance. For example, increased reporting could result in more arrests but a
lower clearance rate without a change in police activity. Using the first measure,
output would go up; using the second, it would go down. Police response time, on
the other hand, has a number of desirable properties; however, a detailed discussion
of response as a proxy for police output will be deferred until the final section.
of this paper.
Two measures representing the level of final output of the criminal justice
system that must be considered are the actual rates of crime and the probability
of an individual being victimized. 2 ' Both have the obvious drawback that they do not
differentiate among crimes and that it is difficult to isolate variations in these
measures resulting from police activities from changes resulting from other factors.
Nevertheless, they are desirable in that they relate closely to what people ultimately
want from law enforcement. They would be very useful if we could include in our
consideration control factors for socio-economic differences in the underlying population. Research dealing with the socio-economic factors of crime has, for the most
part, been carried out by criminologists and sociologists and has not been brought
to bear systematically on problems of evaluating police production and resource
allocation. An important next step for criminal justice research is to coalesce these
two bodies of literature.
It is of interest to note the different implications for the police that are implicit
8

See Shoup & Mehay, Program Budgeting for Urban Police Services, Institute of Government and
Public0 Affairs, X971 (University of California-Los Angeles, Los Angeles) (Mimeographed).
" See Votey & Phillips, The Law Enforcement Production Function, 1969 (University of CaliforniaSanta Barbara, Santa Barbara) (Mimeographed).
" For discussion of the use of police response time, see Larson, On Quantitative Approaches to Urban
Police Patrol Problems, 7 J. Rr.sEAcH N CRamm AND DELINQUENCY 157 (1970).
See PsEsmNr's CoMassION o N LAw ENFo RcErmNT AND THE ADMINISTRATION or JusnicE, Cam
AND ITs IMPAcr-AN Assassmar Ch. 5 (1967) for preliminary examples of victimization studies.

"

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

in choosing the probability of being victimized, as opposed to the crime rate, as the
measure of output. If we choose the former, then "crimes without victims" have no
effect on the level of justice; they are given zero weight in computing the crime rate.
If what we really are after is increasing our security in the sense of avoiding victimization, the implication is that we should not be enforcing laws against crimes of mutual
consent. The purpose of this paper is not to judge the desirability of existing laws;
it is to point out that the output measure which is chosen will have important implications for law enforcement decisions. If certain crimes are given zero weight,
then an optimally run system will not commit resources to reduce their number.
To avoid unintended, incentive effects, the decision-maker must be aware of the
consequences which may be produced by the adoption of a given performance
measure.
D. The Dollar Value of Benefits
An example of the fourth type of measure, the use of cost-benefit analysis in law
enforcement, is given in research conducted by Thurow and Rappaport.2 They
investigate the derivation of an optimal strategy for the enforcement of the minimum wage, overtime pay, and equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. In this specific case, both the benefits and costs are well defined, narrow in
scope, and easily quantified in monetary units. The benefits resulting from enforcement are merely the illegally lost wages restored to workers through enforcement, and the costs are the operating costs of the organization that conducts investigations specifically into these violations. Since sufficient data exists, Thurow
and Rappaport can draw detailed conclusions and are able to avoid the major
methodological difficulties inherent in a more general application of cost-benefit
analysis.
IV
A FUNCTIONAL

APPROACH TO POLICE OUTPUT

While police output should ideally be measured in terms of its contribution
to the final output of the criminal justice system as evidenced by the reduction in
the social cost of crime, a weighted crime rate, the probability of being victimized,
or some other gauge, it does not seem likely that such indicators will totally
meet measurement needs in the near future. The two critical problems are
isolating changes in these measures resulting from police activity and defining
generally accepted operational rules for computing the measuring index.
One way to circumvent these two problems is to find an intermediate output or
function of -the police that is positively related to the desired final output. The
disadvantage with this approach is that one needs additional information to deter-

mine whether the police are being effective in terms of the performance of the
" Thurow & Rappaport, Law Enjorcrmentand Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 PUB. FINANCE 48 (1969).
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system as a whole. Consider, for example, police response time. Most variations
in police response time will be related to police capability, and the average response
time can easily be computed. The difficult, unanswered question is how a given
change in response time will affect the number of crimes.
The approach adopted here is to analyze the basic variables through which police
activity contributes to the reduction of crime and then to look for measures of
performance that relate to these variables. Given the basic laws and the penalties
they provide for various crimes, the police can contribute to the reduction of crime
through two mechanisms. Their activity deters crime by changing the probability
of arrest and by altering the rewards of criminal activity. For example, quick police
response or good detective work will increase the probability that the criminal in
a given crime will be apprehended and convicted. On the other hand, efforts to
improve security-such as locking doors and other measures designed to make
crime more difficult-and efforts by the police to interrupt the distribution of stolen
goods will have a deterrent effect because they reduce the expected gain from
crime. The apprehension and conviction of each criminal has the additional effect
of removing a criminal from society or at least placing him under effective control
which prevents him from committing further crimes.
Shoup and Mehay also point out a third approach to crime control, the alleviation of conditions that lead to crime.24 While this is indeed an important strategy
for reducing crime, the underlying conditions which produce crime are largely
beyond the control of the police. Few police programs are directed to removing
the basic social conditions that produce criminal activity. There are exceptions,
of course, such as police-community relations programs that may reduce crime producing tensions. By and large, however, such efforts are minimal.
The critical factors underlying apprehension and conviction are (I) information or intelligence, (2) police response, and (3) police investigation. If we were
to measure police performance with regard to the probability of apprehending and
convicting the criminal for a given crime, then we might want to use a weighted
index of police capability in these three areas. If, however, one capability dominates
the other three in importance, then a measure of that capability would be a good
proxy for police performance related to apprehension and conviction. Suppose that
the information coming to the police from the public at large is exogenously determined, that is, police activity itself has little effect on the public's willingness to
provide information to them. In that case, the effectiveness of police activity related
to apprehension and conviction will depend on response time and detective
capability alone. It is, however, the feeling of many policemen of all ranks that
for most crimes the probability of an arrest is virtually zero unless the criminal is
caught in the act or there is an eyewitness identification. The latter is largely
2An examination of the nature of deterrence can be found in Lind & Block, A Choice Theoretic

Model of Criminal Deterrents, 1977 (Stanford)
24

Shoup & Mehay, supra note 18, at A-2.

(Mimeographed).
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beyond the control of the police. It appears that for many crimes, investigation is not
effective. This position is to some extent supported by existing data, although not
conclusively documented 5
As was discussed previously, a decrease in police response time does not have
the same effect on the probability of interrupting a crime at all ranges of the scale.
A better measure of police response capability would be the probability of interrupting a crime in progress as a function of the average response time. One
could then evaluate the importance of a quick response for various types of crimes.
If the seriousness of various types of crimes are weighted, then this scale can be used
as a basis of a priority system for police dispatching. This response time function
would take into account both the seriousness of the crime and the relative speed of
response required. In any case, more rapid police responses will lead to a higher
probability of interrupting crimes of all types. Therefore, the average probability
of interrupting a crime in progress, where the average is taken over the entire population of serious crimes, would provide a reasonably good measure of overall police
capability.
This does not mean that detective capability should be ignored entirely. It is
obviously important for the police to have investigatory capability; but if it is true
that the major impact of the police with regard to apprehension and conviction comes
from interrupting crimes in progress, then one should look very closely at the
cost-effectiveness of response capability as opposed to detective capability. One
difficulty with this measure of performance is that it neglects the police role in
obtaining information that may contribute to arrest and apprehension. In other
words, it does not take into account the possibility of the police improving their
performance through their own intelligence system or through increased cooperation
with the public.
A measure of police performance which would reflect all three capabilities is the
rate of conviction resulting from arrests. If the performance of the prosecutor and
the courts is taken as given, then the performance of the police with regard to
apprehension and conviction can be measured by the ratio of persons convicted to
the total number of criminal acts committed. It is important here to use the total
number of crimes as the numeraire and not the number of reported crimes in order
to avoid crediting the police with a high measure of performance merely because
many crimes never were reported to them. A problem with this measure is that the
number of convictions not only depends on the arrest rate but also on court loads
and the decisions by the prosecutor with regard to prosecution. If the ratio of
arrests to convictions remained constant, then the ratio of arrests to crimes committed
could be substituted for the conviction rate as a measure of police performance.
It is, however, desirable to measure both rates and to analyze the ratio of arrests to
convictions. If this ratio goes up, it indicates that either there are problems relating
2" See PRFSIDENT'S Com
AND TECHNOLOGY 93 (1967).
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to prosecution and the courts or that the police are making arrests on less evidence.
It should be noted that throughout this paper the actual crime rate has been
used in various measures of police output. At the present time, there are few statistics
on actual rates of crime. Such statistics can be obtained by sample survey techniques.
It is of extreme importance that in the future this data be collected on a more
systematic basis. In the short run what is required for the evaluation of police
performance is the development of special surveys to get necessary information for
particular studies.
Reduction of the financial reward of specific crimes and the resulting decrease
in the incentive for committing these crimes is an important deterrent effect of police
activity. In order to evaluate police performance in this area it is critical that we
do further studies of the actual payoffs of various types of crime so that we can
determine the rates of return to individuals engaging in such crime. Also, one
must compare this information with data on alternative sources of income for these
individuals. In many cases, crime is a direct substitute for legal employment or for
investment.2 6
Almost no empirical work has been done relating the gain from crime to
alternative sources of income for the criminal and relating both to the decision to
engage in crime. Furthermore, very little empirical work has been done relating
the rewards from various types of crime to the several activities of the police. This
is an extremely promising area for study. It would help answer such questions of
police strategy as whether it is more effective to prevent burglary by apprehending
and convicting burglars or by impeding the distribution system for stolen goods.
The studies would explore such issues as how much the price paid for stolen goods
would have to be reduced to make theft unprofitable.
CONCLUSION

The pursuit of justice requires the use of scarce resources and, thus, competes
with the pursuit of other desirable ends. Therefore, justice, like these other ends,
is not a matter of all or none, but a matter of more or less. How much justice is
produced is an important choice and this choice is part of overall resource allocation.
To rationally decide the question of how much to spend on justice one must
weigh the alternatives; that is, a rational allocation of resources to the functions of
the criminal justice system requires a comparison of the costs and benefits where
the costs represent the cost of foregone alternatives.
A conceptual framework for making these tradeoffs is developed when one considers that crime imposes a cost and that the function of the criminal justice system
is to reduce these costs through the control of crime. Within this framework, one
can compare the gains from crime reduction with the costs of law enforcement
including both the resource costs and other uncompensated costs that may result
" Lind

& Block, supra note 23.
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from law enforcement. An optimal system would be one which minimized the
combined costs of crime and law enforcement.
The police are a critical part of the criminal justice system, and ideally one
would measure their performance in terms of their contribution to the output of
the total system. However, because there are conceptual difficulties inherent in
the measurement of the cost of crime and because the police are only one part of the
criminal justice system, other measures of police performance must be developed
to serve the practical needs of planning and evaluation, management control, and
contracting. To be of practical value, as well as conceptually contistent with higher
level objectives, these output measures must be tailored to their intended uses.
To evaluate overall police performance, it is important to note that the two
primary ways that the police can reduce crime is to increase the probability of arrest
and conviction and -to reduce the payoff from crime, either by making crime more
difficult and therefore more costly, or by reducing the actual financial gain to the
criminal. The success of the police in doing the former can be measured by
the ratio of arrests leading to conviction to actual crimes committed. Their success
in reducing the payoff from crime can be measured by computing the actual payoffs
and costs of various types of crime. The data requirements in both cases are a
problem. The first requires a measure of actual rather than reported crime, as
well as data on convictions relating to crime committed in particular police jurisdictions. The second requires data on property losses from crimes, as well as a
measure of the cost of committing crime.
While conceptual difficulties and data problems do exist, it is possible to develop
and use performance measures for police programs. This is imperative because the
effective planning, evaluation, and implementation of police programs requires the
definition and measurement of police output. No one measure will satisfy all
needs. One must carefully analyze alternative measures of performance to determine
if they satisfy the criteria for particular uses. Only when we have developed satisfactory measures of performance can we know what the police are producing, if they
are producing at minimum cost, and whether we are buying too much or too little
police service.

